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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
The Crisis in Idlib
Turkey Caught Between a Rock 
and a Hard Place
The ceasefire agreement for Idlib signed 
between Russia and Turkey on March 
5th is a step towards de-escalation. 
Yet, it remains doubtful whether this 
can translate into more than just pro-
viding short-term relief. To secure EU 
support in Idlib, Turkey has sought to in-
crease pressure on European countries 
by “opening” its borders for refugees to 
travel on to the EU. While Ankara’s in-
strumentalization of refugees is appall-
ing, the humanitarian situation requires 
European support. Hence, the EU should 
coordinate with the US to increase pres-
sure on Russia to facilitate a safe zone 
in northern Idlib in addition to the fur-
ther humanitarian assistance the EU 
has pledged. To respond to the immedi-
ate pressure on its borders, the EU will 
have little choice but to negotiate a new 
deal building on the 2016 EU-Turkey ref-
ugee agreement, given the continuing 
disagreement on asylum and migration 
policy among EU member states. 
Tensions between Turkey and the Syr-
ian regime, backed by Russia and Iran, 
over Idlib have been rising since De-
cember and dramatically escalated 
in recent weeks as Syrian and Turk-
ish forces entered into direct conflict. 
The agreed ceasefire, which entered 
into force at 00:01 on March 6th, has 
brought some relief but it essentially 
only postpones the problem of finding 
a more sustainable solution. 
Apart from reaching a fragile ceasefire, 
the agreement falls significantly short 
of Turkey’s initial demands. President 
Erdoğan had been adamant in recent 
weeks that Turkey expected Syrian 
forces to withdraw to the boundar-
ies set out in the 2018 Sochi Agree-
ment and to see the establishment of a 
safe zone to accommodate the around 1 
million internally displaced people, ma-
ny of whom have been moving towards 
the Turkish border. However - not sur-
prisingly - Ankara has not been able to 
negotiate either of these demands. In 
addition to the fragile ceasefire, Mos-
cow and Ankara agreed to establish a 
security corridor 6km to the north and 
6km to the south of the strategically 
important M4 highway, with joint Turk-
ish-Russian patrols along the highway 
from Trumba to Ain-Al-Havr starting 
on March 15th. There is no mention of 
a withdrawal of Syrian forces, nor of a 
solution to the humanitarian crisis. The 
Turkish government had already start-
ed to manage expectations prior to the 
meeting, emphasizing that its key pri-
ority was to secure a ceasefire. 
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Turkey is stuck between a rock and a 
hard place. While Ankara has miscal-
culated its relations with Moscow, it 
has invested too much in Syria to just 
withdraw. At home, the government 
is facing immense pressure. Turkey is 
already hosting around 3.7 million ref-
ugees and the risk of more refugees 
entering the country is fueling wide-
spread resentment. In addition, the 
rising death toll of Turkish soldiers is 
making it increasingly hard for the gov-
ernment to maintain public support 
for the offensive. Unlike Turkey’s pre-
vious incursions against Kurdish forces 
in northeastern Syria, which was wide-
ly considered necessary to protect na-
tional security, there is much less pub-
lic understanding for the necessity to 
fight in Idlib. To manage the growing 
public dissatisfaction, Twitter was tem-
porarily blocked in Turkey and expres-
sions of protest under the slogan “no to 
war” (“savaşa hayır”) were banned in a 
number of cities. 
As a consequence, Turkey has sought 
support from NATO and the EU. On 
February 28th, a NATO emergency 
meeting was held at Ankara’s request. 
President Erdoğan and NATO Secretary 
General Jens Stoltenberg met again on 
March 09th. In addition, by “opening” 
its borders for refugees to travel on to 
Europe Turkey has sought to pressure 
European countries into providing sup-
port, not only with regard to refugee 
management in Turkey but also with 
regard to the situation in Idlib. How-
ever, there has been a reluctance to 
commit to concrete measures to help 
Turkey, whose policies and recurrent 
anti-Western rhetoric have disgruntled 
its Western partners.  
While Ankara’s instrumentalization of 
refugees is unquestionably appalling, 
the humanitarian situation urgently re-
quires European support. On June 29th 
and 30th, the EU will convene a fourth 
Brussels Conference on “Supporting 
the Future of Syria and the Region” – 
a lot can happen until then. While it is 
unclear how much Moscow can lean 
on the Assad regime at the end of the 
day, Russia’s military support and con-
trol of the airspace over Idlib is un-
questionably crucial. Hence, the EU 
should coordinate with the US to in-
crease pressure on Russia to facilitate a 
safe zone in northern Idlib. A de-esca-
lation of the situation in Idlib will like-
ly also help to decrease the pressure on 
the Greek-Turkish border. While there 
are plenty of good reasons to feel more 
than uncomfortable, the EU has little 
choice but to work with Turkey, given 
European countries’ inability to agree 
on migration and asylum policy. In ad-
dition to the further humanitarian as-
sistance the EU has pledged, this will 
require a new deal with Turkey based 
on and learning from the flaws of the 
2016 agreement. This also entails rec-
ognizing that the current horrific situ-
ation at the Greek-Turkish border is at 
least partly home-made. 
